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Since the beginning of the twenty-first century, Chinahas become a major economic player in Africa due toits interest in the continent’s deposits of raw materials
and hydrocarbons. It is also concerned with forging a fruitful
political partnership with Africa, which would give it a
stronger influence within the international community. 
China’s presence in Africa can be gauged by the increase in
bilateral trade, (1) which went from $12.3 billion in 2002 to
$40 billion in 2005 before climbing to $55.5 billion the fol-
lowing year and to $72.9 billion in 2007. 
Criticism of China’s policy in Africa has become common-
place. China is accused of establishing colonial relations
with Africa by importing the continent’s raw materials (2)
while exporting value-added finished products. Chinese
businesses also benefit from the situation of the yuan, a cur-
rency that is notoriously undervalued, while countries in the
franc zone are penalised through the appreciation of the
CFA franc, itself linked to the Euro. Chinese companies are
also accused of engaging in all-out competition with African
countries in third markets such as the European Union. The
clothing industry in Morocco (which represents 45 percent
of industrial jobs) has been made particularly vulnerable
since cancellation of the Multi-Fibre Arrangement (MFA)
on 1 January 2005 liberalised China-EU trade in this area.
Similarly, the AGOA Agreements (3) designed to encourage
exports, especially of textiles, from African countries to the
United States now seem much less attractive. These are not
the only criticisms. Chinese conglomerates are also blamed
for the shoddy workmanship of African infrastructure, the
mediocre quality of traded goods, and the fact that their
workforce is recruited from China and poorly paid. (4) The
profits made by Chinese entrepreneurs are also seldom rein-
vested locally. Beijing grants financial aid in a cavalier fash-
ion without any concern for the solvency of its debtors.
Indeed, during a meeting of G8 Finance Ministers in May
2007, Western countries publicly expressed concern that
China’s attitude was a contributing factor in the indebted-
ness of African states. In the words of German Finance
Minister Peer Steinbrück, “We note that China has a grow-
ing interest in African resources (…), (5)” which is leading it
“to start all over again the very thing we were hoping to put
an end to with our debt reduction program, namely, the over-
indebtedness of African countries.” Finally, Chinese invest-
ment gives comfort to autocratic regimes such as those of
José Dos Santos in Angola or Omar al-Bashir in Sudan. In
2007 these two states accounted for 47 percent of all
China’s imports from the African continent.
There is no shortage of arguments denouncing the negative
impact of China’s presence in Africa. Neo-colonialism is a
term routinely used not only in Europe, but now also by
African elites, former South African President Thabo
Mbeki being a case in point. (6) A detailed analysis of the sit-
uation reveals a somewhat different picture, however. This
article does not discuss the motivations the PRC may have
for being in Africa, or its investment strategies, which have
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1. Statistical data from the Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China:
http://www.mofcom.gov.cn/.
2. In 2006, according to a WTO report, “Statistics of international trade,” p. 214, raw mate-
rials (hydrocarbons, wood, cotton) made up 90.5% of Chinese imports from Africa, with
agricultural products making up 6.8 %.
3. The AGOA law (African Growth and Opportunity Act) adopted in 2000 aims to facilitate
the access of African goods to the American market via preferential measures and to
contribute thereby to the development of the local economies.
4. Lafargue François, “La Chine, une puissance en Afrique,” Perspectives chinoises, 2005,
n° 90, p. 3; “China’s Presence in Africa,” China Perspectives, No. 61, September-October
2005, pp. 2-9.
5. AFP wire service, 19 May 2007.
6. In December 2006, during the 14th National Congress of the South African Students
Congress (SASCO) held in Cape Town, the South African President Thabo Mbeki declared
that Africa should not have a colonial relationship with China by being a mere provider
of raw materials. See also the contribution by Anabela Lemos and Daniel Ribeiro,
“Mozambique: Taking Ownership or Just Changing Owners?” in Firoze Manji and
Stephen Marks, African Perspectives on China in Africa, Nairobi and Oxford, 2007, p. 63.
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The economic and diplomatic presence of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in Africa continues to generate
commentary and analyses that are often unflattering, and there is no lack of argument to denounce its negative
effects. However, a detailed analysis of the situation reveals quite a different reality. While it is undeniable that
China’s influence in Africa has grown, its economic interests there remain limited. 
China in Africa: A Limited Conquest
already been the subject of a number of studies. (7) It does,
however, indicate the need for a sense of proportion to
understand China’s growing influence in Africa, given that
the scope of its economic interests there remains limited.
The whole discourse on “China’s conquest of Africa” must
be seen in the context of a common yet largely unhelpful cri-
tique of Beijing’s policy, which has little to do with the actu-
al situation. In fact, China’s African policies have subjected
it to a barrage of criticism that is not always justified. C hi na ’s  pl ac e in  Afri ca  r em a insl im ite d
The PRC is today Africa’s third most important trading part-
ner. Table 1 shows that since 2000 the amount of trade
between Africa and China has increased by 600 percent,
compared with 197 percent for the United States and
Africa. The increase in China-Africa exchanges is clearly
indisputable, but it falls within a general increase in trade
between Africa and the rest of the world (135 percent since
2000). In fact, the place of the PRC in the trade of African
countries remains limited. Whilst the PRC is in the top rank
of importers for several African nations, notably South
Africa and Egypt, China’s share of total imports from Africa
amounted to 9.2 percent in 2006. According to World Trade
Organisation (WTO) data, (8) in 2007, the PRC purchased
8.6 percent of the exports of African countries (that is,
$36.53 billion out of a total of $424 billion), and remains far
behind the European Union (38.2 percent) and the United
States (22.4 percent). In 2000, the PRC bought 3.7 per-
cent of the exports of African countries against 39 percent
for the European Union and 19.7 percent for the United
States. This increase in China-Africa trade can be explained
not only by an increase in the volume of exchanges but also
by the nature of Chinese imports, principally comprised of
mining products and hydrocarbons, the value of which has
sharply risen in recent years. In contrast, purchases made by
the European Union are more diversified and include more
agricultural products and manufactured goods, the value of
which has remained basically stable. In 2006, hydrocarbons
and mining products represented 85 percent of the PRC’s
imports from Africa against 63 percent for the European
Union.
Similarly, financial figures indicate a need to put the
Chinese presence into an appropriate perspective. (9) In
2006, China’s foreign direct investment (FDI) in Africa (10)
amounted to $2.56 billion compared with $49.2 million in
1990 and $491 million in 2003. The growth in China’s
investments is clearly substantial, but in terms of stock and
financial transfers, these investments remain very much
below European and American capital investment in Africa.
In 2005, United States investment stock in Africa amounted
to $23 billion dollars, (11) with that of France totalling $15.55
billion. (12) Even in countries where China’s presence is con-
sidered to be the most significant, such as Angola or
Algeria, China’s FDI remains well below that of the former
colonial powers. In 2006, Africa received $36 billion in for-
eign investment, of which $519 million came from China —
that is, 1.4 percent — as against $2.1 billion from the United
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7. Cf. in particular Chris Alden, China in Africa, Partner, Competitor or Hegemon?, Zed
Books, 2007.
8. World Bank Report, “International Trade Statistics,” 2007 and 2000. 
9. It is difficult to put an exact figure on Chinese investment in Africa, as some of this
investment is made through Singapore and Hong Kong.
10. Mofcom, “Statistical Bulletin of China’s Outward Foreign Direct Investment,” 2006, p. 54.
11. US Ministry of Trade, Official Bureau of Economic Analysis, http:// www.bea.gov/.
12. Bank of France “Balance des paiements et position extérieure,” [Balance of Payments
and External Position] Report for 2006.
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States. In 2007, there was a real spike in Chinese FDI in
Africa, thanks to an exceptional event. This was the acquisi-
tion of 20 percent of the capital of the continent’s leading
bank, the Standard Bank in South Africa, by the Industrial
and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC), China’s leading
bank, for $5.46 billion.
In 2006, Africa was the destination of 1 percent of American
investments abroad, 2.4 percent of French investment (13) and
2.9 percent of China’s (as against 43.4 percent in Asia). In
February 2007, the Chinese Deputy Trade Minister, Wei
Jianguo, announced that the value of China’s approved
investments in Africa now exceeded $6.6 billion. While such
a statement gives credence to the view that China has a stran-
glehold over Africa, it does little to explain how there can be
such discrepancies with respect to the UNCTAD data,
which indicate only half that amount. In the first place, invest-
ments that are actually committed are not always distin-
guished from projects that are merely approved. In particular,
there is a kind of deliberate blurring of the boundaries
between the investment of companies (both public and pri-
vate) and aid money (loans and gifts) vouchsafed by the
Chinese state, especially through the Exim Bank.
As to the public development aid (PDA) made available by
Peking, it was estimated to total some $2.6 billion in
2004, (14) and is expected to climb to $10 billion in 2009. By
way of comparison, the net US aid (15) to Africa was worth
$4.5 billion in 2007 (excluding debt relief). (16) President
Bush announced his intention to increase this aid to $9 bil-
lion (17) by 2010. For its part, the Committee for
Development Aid (CDA) of the European Union (that is,
15 states) set its contribution at $18.6 billion in 2006. That
same year, according to OECD data, Sub-Saharan Africa
received $43.3 billion in PDA. Of this sum, $11.4 billion
was for Nigeria, $2 billion for Sudan and $2 billion for the
Democratic Republic of Congo. Some 72.5 percent of this
total of $43 billion was made up of contributions by CDA
members for bilateral aid – and this does not include their
participation in multilateral aid. China’s aid to Africa there-
fore seems weak by comparison. It is not easy, however, to
put a precise figure on it, as Beijing does not publish any
official statistics and lumps together, under the term “aid,”
both zero-interest loans or loans with preferential rates of
interest and donations. Such assistance is granted by several
institutions, such as the China EximBank, the China
Development Bank, or the Trade Ministry. One thing is cer-
tain, however: the economic and financial weight of China
in Africa remains considerably below that of the former colo-
nial powers and the United States.
China’s policy has also been stigmatised owing to the grant-
ing of loans irrespective of the criteria determined by the
OECD countries, in particular the Equator Principles. A
case in point is Beijing granting, at the time of Hu Jintao’s
visit to Cameroon (30 January-1 February 2007), of sever-
al donations totalling 2.56 billion FCFA (that is, 3.9 million
euros) and three loans amounting to 46.9 billion FCFA
(71.5 million euros), half of which is to be allocated to the
financing of a telecommunications project.
However, international institutions and the African press do
not fail to point out the risks of this rapprochement with
China. As the weekly Repères (18) points out, Beijing’s
financial assistance sets up a mechanism for perpetual
indebtedness. Cameroon had managed to fulfil the objec-
tives imposed by international financial institutions, and by
2006 had reached the end point of the HIPC initiative. (19)
In partnership with its creditors, Yaoundé had undertaken
efforts to partially discharge its public foreign debt, which
had gone from 110.2 percent of GDP in 1997 to 60.2 per-
cent in 2004. But the PRC’s concern proved to be danger-
ous, since according to the OECD report African
Economic Outlook, (20) Cameroon’s debt is expected to have
climbed from 4.8 percent of GDP in 2007 to 6 percent in
2009. These charges laid against Beijing seem justified
given that, unlike members of the CDA, the PRC prefers
to give loans rather than donations. These loans are grant-
ed according to certain economic requirements, such as hav-
ing a Chinese firm carry out the work. Nonetheless, it is not
clear that such criticisms are well founded, since Beijing
also regularly cancels debts owed to it, and for some debtors
experiencing a significant increase in their GDP, the bur-
den of servicing the debt is reduced. In March 2004, the
PRC gave a loan of $2 billion to Angola, which was main-
ly designed to finance infrastructure provided by Chinese
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13. Bank of France, op.cit
14. Joshua Kurlantzick, “Beijing’s Safari: China’s Move into Africa and its Implications for
Aid, Development and Governance,” in Carnegie Endowment Policy Outlook No. 29,
November 2006.
15. These figures take no account of the contribution to multilateral bodies such as the
UNPD or the UNHCR.
16. OECD, “Development Co-operation,” 2007 Report.
17. Michael Fletcher, “Bush has quietly tripled aid to Africa,” Washington Post, 31 December
2006.
18. Repères, 7 February 2007, Yaoundé.
19. The initiative in favour of Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) is an international
mechanism set up in 1996 with the goal of reducing the amount of debt of the poorest
nations to a sustainable level. States benefiting from these arrangements must commit
themselves to respecting strict measures of macro-economic stability. Once a certain
benchmark has been reached, countries may apply for a higher level of aid. 
20. OECD report, “African Economic Outlook,” 2008, p. 217.
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firms. This loan represented 10 percent of Angola’s GDP
at the time. Five years later, the amount of the loan, already
partially reimbursed, represents only 2.27 percent of the
country’s GDP.C hi na  a s  a cont est ed  po we r inA fri ca
In Africa, the PRC is often described as a predatory power,
preoccupied with acquiring raw materials. This charge needs
to be set in context, however. In 2007, China bought 12.5
percent of all petroleum exported by African countries, com-
pared with 31.7 percent purchased by the United States and
31.5 percent by the European Union. Since 2000,
American imports of oil from Africa have increased by 70
percent, and those of China by 220 percent, but in terms of
volume, US acquisitions are more than 2.5 times greater
than those of Beijing. According to data in a report by the
International Energy Agency (IEA), (21) imports of crude oil
from Africa by the PRC were 0.92 million b/j in 2006, that
is, 32 percent of its foreign purchases. (22)
In the petroleum sector, the influence of the PRC should be
judged relative to that of Anglo-Saxon operators. In Nigeria,
Exxon-Mobil accounts for roughly one third of the country’s
oil production, alongside Chevron, Agip, and Total. In most
African countries, China has only managed to secure sec-
ondary petroleum concessions. Penetration by Chinese
investment is especially noticeable in states on the fringe of
the international community, such as Angola and the Sudan.
These two states represent three-quarters of China’s oil
imports from Africa. Elsewhere, however, Chinese compa-
nies face stiff competition from the West, and the pro-
nouncements that Chinese officials are wont to make should
not be misunderstood. 
One of the leading French economic newspapers, La
Tribune, describes the contract set up by the CNPC (China
National Petroleum Corporation) in Niger in April 2008 as
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21. Report of the International Energy Agency, “World Energy Outlook, China and India
Insight,” 2007, p 325.
22. Different figures appear in the “BP Statistical review of world energy,” 2007. According
to its estimates, the PRC imported 923 000 b/j of crude oil from Africa in 2006, that is,
21% of its total imports; in 2007, the figure was 1 million barrels, or 20% of its imports.
A Senegalese man waves a Chinese flag on February 13, 2009 in Dakar as he waits for Chinese President Hu Jintao’s
arrival from Dakar aiport. China’s President Hu Jintao arrived in Senegal for the second stage of a whirlwind 
four-nation African tour meant to boost cooperation amid criticism that Beijing is exploiting the continent. © AFP
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“a huge contract illustrating the level of penetration of Chinese
interests in Africa (…). It is the largest investment ever imag-
ined by a Chinese player in Africa. The China National
Petroleum Corporation has landed a $5 billion contract to
develop and promote the country’s petroleum resources. Over
the next three years it is due to extract crude oil from the area
known as ‘Agadem,’ with proven reserves most recently esti-
mated at 324 million barrels.” (23) This enormous contract could
easily be seen, however, as a small consolation, considering
that ESSO had already prospected the Agadem deposit sev-
eral times since the 1960s, followed by the Malaysian compa-
ny Petronas, all without success. Even if the size of the alleged
reserves proves to be correct, they would represent just 0.3 per-
cent of all of Africa’s petroleum reserves. 
Massive state subsidies allow Chinese companies to commit
to huge projects without any guarantee of return on invest-
ment, while Western companies cannot afford the same lux-
ury. These investments in the energy sector are no doubt
determined more by political than financial concerns. Apart
from Angola or Sudan, neither CNPC nor SINOPEC
(China Petroleum and Chemical Corporation) have been in
a position to gain oil concessions that offer much promise. In
North Africa, too, results have been limited. In the area of
hydrocarbons, the PRC is no more than a marginal client of
the Maghrebi countries at the moment, since only 2.1 per-
cent of Algerian oil exports go to China, compared with 5
percent to Libya. Overall, this region of North Africa is
responsible for a mere 2 percent of Chinese oil imports.
China is penalised by its distance from Mediterranean coun-
tries, and by the need for oil tankers to go through the Suez
Canal, which is close to choking point today.
In Libya, where CNPC invested by taking advantage of the
regime’s isolation, Chinese companies face Anglo-Saxon
competitors since the lifting of American sanctions in 2004.
The first contracts awarded to Beijing gave it only very lim-
ited areas in which to prospect. The PRC even suffered an
affront when the Taiwanese public company Chinese
Petroleum Corporation was granted a license to operate in
the Murzuk field 162 in the third round of bids in December
2006. In Angola, Chinese operations seem to have stalled
since the beginning of 2007, as the gradual rehabilitation of
President Dos Santos has enabled him to seek out Western
investors such as Total. The United States remains the pri-
mary destination of Angola’s petroleum, and no Chinese
company is the main player in any of its operational off-shore
sites. While Angola is sometimes presented (24) in caricature
mode as a “province” of China, the reality is much more
complex. Like Algeria, Angola has been able to maintain
close relations with other nations such as Portugal and the
United States, (25) and the PRC was only its fourth largest
supplier in 2006.
Imports of minerals from Africa also feed criticism of China,
which is now an important buyer of metals, wood products,
and cotton in Africa. Once again, however, the former colo-
nial powers and the United States still occupy a dominant
position. In 2006, China’s imports of minerals and metals
from Africa amounted to $3.3 billion as compared with
$3.97 billion for the United States, and $10.15 billion for
the European Union. (26) In spite of sustained growth in its
purchases from Africa, Beijing’s share remains quite small.
Moreover, these raw materials are mainly for the production
of manufactured goods for exported to the European Union
and not for local consumption. However, China’s regular
investments in Africa lead it to be blamed as the main cause
of the rising cost of raw materials in the energy and agricul-
tural sectors.
At first sight, the rise in the price of a barrel of oil can be
explained by strong demand from Asia, given that consump-
tion in China has jumped by 60 percent and in India by 15
percent since 2000. China is now the world’s second largest
consumer of petroleum after the United States, and India is
ranked sixth. Nonetheless, this attributing of a crisis to Asian
demand is only part of the picture, and while the press smug-
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23. La Tribune, 3 June 2008.
24. Centre for Chinese Studies, “China’s Interest and Activity in Africa’s Construction and
Infrastructure Sectors,” Stellenbosch University. 
25. Indira Campos and Alex Vines, “Angola and China: A Pragmatic Partnership,” Working
Paper, Chatham House, March 2008.
26. WTO, “International Trade Statistics,” 2007, pp. 213-217.
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ly describes China as a “glutton,” the reality is quite differ-
ent. Consumption of oil in China is still at a very low level
compared with Western countries, especially the United
States. China’s per capita oil consumption is less than 9 per-
cent of that of the United States. In fact, oil consumption by
America’s 22 million inhabitants is not quite half that of
China’s 1.4 billion. In addition, in China’s defence, petrole-
um‘s portion of the country’s total energy consumption is just
20 percent, as against 40 percent in the United States, since
in China petroleum is largely used for refining into petrol,
with only limited use as fuel. Also worth noting is the fact
that private ownership of motor vehicles in China is quite a
recent phenomenon, which means that most of the vehicles
in circulation consume less fuel than in the United States. 
Finally, China’s growth (11.1 percent in 2006, increasing to
11.4 percent in 2007), which is often held responsible for
this thirst for energy, should be put into context. The coun-
try’s increased growth in 2007 represents something in the
order of $449 billion, still below that of the US GNP
growth rate (2.1 percent), although it is worth $649 billion.
Whereas China and India account for 38 percent of the
world’s population, they represent only 12 percent of world
petroleum consumption, compared with 50 percent for the
United States, Japan, and the European Union, which make
up only 15 percent of the world’s population. The countries
of Africa, most of which have no hydrocarbon resources, are
proving vulnerable to the rising cost of oil, as is the case with
Senegal and Burkina Faso. Even those countries that are oil
producers, such as Nigeria, are obliged, owing to their lack
of refining capacity, to import a portion of their petrol at
steadily rising cost. (27) The charges brought against China
seem, however, to be excessive. 
The rise in the cost of hydrocarbons is causing an increase
in the price of petrochemicals such as manure. In Europe, (28)
between October 2006 and September 2007 the price of a
tonne of Baltic urea went up by 43 percent, and that of a
tonne of ammonium sulphate by 66 percent. An inflation of
this magnitude is one of the reasons for the food crisis cur-
rently being experienced by several African countries. (29) But
this situation can also be explained by price increases (due
to the increase in the price of raw materials such as hydro-
carbons) resulting from the development of bio-fuels in
industrialised countries and changes in eating habits in
developing countries such as India and China. (30) Such argu-
ments are often put forward with good reason, but they are
quite unjust in stressing the extent of China’s responsibility.
In 2006, food imports from China reached $51.6 billion
compared with $19.5 billion in 2000. (31) During the same
period, food imports from the United States rose from $69
to 103 billion. With 19 percent of the world’s population,
China has only 5 percent of the world’s arable land. Not
only does China’s portion of purchases on the world’s food
markets remain modest, the country actually manages to be
an exporter of wheat and rice. According to FAO data, in
2006 China imported 1 million tonnes of rice (manufac-
tured equivalent) and exported 1.4 million tonnes. Chinese
imports of rice represent 4.1 percent of the world total.
China’s responsibility in the world food crisis should there-
fore be seen in a relative light, all the more so in that recent
riots, particularly in Egypt, were caused by an increase in
the price of bread, which resulted from an increase in wheat
prices. China remains a net exporter of wheat, and its
imports of maize are still modest, representing just 5.5 per-
cent of purchases worldwide. In the same vein, and unlike
some European countries and the United States, China has
not engaged in a massive conversion of agricultural land to
develop agro-fuels. (32) The production of ethanol-based car-
burant (such as E10) remains at a very low level and is
unlikely to increase substantially. Agricultural land is still pri-
marily used for food-producing purposes. Co nclus ion
At the 24th Africa-France Summit held in Cannes in
February 2007, President Jacques Chirac hailed the positive
role being played by China in Africa. At the closing press
conference, the French President declared:
First of all, I warmly welcome what China has been
doing in Africa, which is in my eyes a positive step. I
had the opportunity to talk at length with President
Hu Jintao, just before the African Summit in Peking,
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27. Due to very limited refining capacity, the cost of petrol is increasing more rapidly than
that of crude oil. 
28. FAO, “Crop Prospects and Food Situation,” November 2007.
29. According to FAO data, in the summer of 2008, 21 African countries experienced seri-
ous food insecurity. 
30. In May 2008, US President George W. Bush claimed that the inflation of food prices was
mainly due to the emergence of a middle class in India.
31. Idem, p. 214.
32. The use of agricultural land for producing agro-fuels is often cited as an aggravating
factor in the rise in prices. Speaking at the FAO Summit in Rome in June 2008, President
Lula stated that in Brazil, crops used for the production of ethanol take up a mere 1 per-
cent of agricultural land, adding that “bio-fuels are not outlaws threatening the food
security of the poorest nations.” This interpretation is not shared by the World Bank. In
the conclusion to its April 2008 policy note, “Rising Food Prices: Policy Options and World
Bank Response,” it points to the heavy responsibility of bio-fuels in the rising price of
food. The OECD makes the same observation in “An economic assessment of the poli-
cies supporting bio-fuels,” Martin von Lampe, July 2008.
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and we spoke a great deal about China-Africa rela-
tions, which are necessary, as Africa needs to have
relations with the entire world, not just in the sphere
of economics but also politically and culturally. The
last two visits to Africa by Chinese officials and
President Hu Jintao have been positive, judging by
all the opinions expressed by the African authorities.
Consequently, as I say, I am delighted at this new
connection between Africa and China. (33)
This satisfaction surprised many observers, who were
expecting a more critical appraisal of Beijing’s role from the
former French head of state. For France, China’s presence
has the advantage of fostering economic development by
bringing in low-cost consumer items such as machine tools
(tractors, agricultural machines, etc.). The PRC is also play-
ing a role in passing on agricultural techniques. In this sense,
French policy is in line with the views expressed by the
OECD, (34) which takes a rather favourable view of China’s
investment in Africa, (35) given that economic development is
considered to be a precondition of Africa’s democratisation.
President Chirac emphasised that cooperation with China
can prove beneficial for African countries, in spite of increas-
ing criticism in Africa (36) and Europe (37) directed at Beijing’s
African diplomacy, which are not really justified in the light
of China’s still limited presence on the African continent.
Animosity towards China can be explained by several fac-
tors. In the first place, Chinese firms have invested in sectors
such as the construction industry and public works where
their achievements are there for all to behold (roads, dams,
bridges). In Angola, the majority of Chinese investments are
in the construction industry. This approach is in response to
a demand by African countries after the West began to slow
down the pace of “white elephant” infrastructure develop-
ment in the 1980s following several spectacular failures. The
modest engagement of local workers and the huge number
of Chinese expatriates is a regular source of ill-feeling, and
the rapid growth of China’s trade and investment in Africa
feeds into this feeling of “Chinese colonisation.” Chinese
investments are concentrated in raw materials (mines, ener-
gy sector), but also in the manufacture of everyday consumer
items (loincloths, tractors). Chinese competition greatly
weakens local African capitalism. In particular, China’s pres-
ence is evident through the thousands of its nationals living
in Africa (thought to be around 750,000), (38) well above the
number of Westerners; it is estimated that in December
2007 about 155,000 French nationals were settled in Africa,
half of whom were in Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia, while
in 2006, 22,000 Chinese were living in Angola, (39) most of
them working for a Chinese company. China’s presence in
Africa is indisputable, but it must be properly understood.
Here, as elsewhere, the PRC’s position is relative to its
standing worldwide. •
•Translated by Peter Brown
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33. Press conference, 16 February 2007, source: http://www.elysee.fr/.
34. OECD Report, “The Rise of China and India. What’s in it for Africa?”, 2006.
35. Cf. also Chris Alden, who stresses that China-Africa relations are complex, involving
reciprocal interests. Chris Alden, China in Africa, Partner, Competitor or Hegemon?, Zed
Books, 2007.
36. The journalist Noé Ndjebet Massoussi, from the Cameroon daily Le Messager, n° 2301,
31 January 2007, p. 3, relates the failures of the roads built by China and concludes by
asking, “Isn’t the image that China used to be stuck with, that of a country doing shod-
dy work that won’t last any time at all, overtaking these other works carried out by rep-
resentatives of the Middle Empire?” 
37. In November 2007, the European Parliament adopted a resolution entitled “Chinese pol-
icy and its effects on Africa,” which “points out that China’s untrammelled investment in
African countries which are subject to the bad governance of oppressive regimes is con-
tributing to perpetuating human rights’ violations and merely serves to reinforce such
bad governance.“ 
38. Alden, op.cit, p. 121.
39. Op cit., p. 23.
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